We study axiomatically situations in which the society agrees to treat voters with different characteristics distinctly. In this setting, we propose a set of intuitive axioms and show that they jointly characterize a new class of voting procedures, called Type-weighted Approval Voting. According to this family, each voter has a strictly positive and finite weight (the weight is necessarily the same for all voters with the same characteristics) and the alternative with the highest number of weighted votes is elected. The implemented voting procedure reduces to Approval Voting in case all voters are identical or the procedure assigns the same weight to all types. Using this idea, we also obtain a new characterization of Approval Voting.
Introduction
Motivation There are many instances in which the members of a society or an institution vote in order to take a decision and each voter's impact on the outcome depends on her/his underlying characteristics. Examples include the EU Member Council or the IMF Board of Directors, where the weight of a country is determined by its population size or its stake, respectively (see , Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix); management boards, where the vote of the CEO tends to count double in case of a tie; or hiring decisions in academic institutions, where the opinion of senior members is usually given more weight. From a theoretical point of view, this implies that voters are not treated equally and that existing axiomatic results on the question of which voting procedure to implement do not directly apply. It is consequently the aim of this study to complement the existing literature on axiomatic voting theory by suggesting a general class of voting procedures that is able to cover these kinds of situations.
The aggregation procedures discussed in the literature differ essentially in the type of information they take into account from the individual preferences. For example, Plurality Voting, the most widely used voting procedure, allows each individual to indicate only her most preferred alternative (and the alternative with most votes is elected). One common critique of Plurality Voting is that it may actually result in the election of the worst alternative for a majority of individuals even in single-winner elections. As a simple example, consider the case when there are three alternatives, two of which are very similar. Then, if the votes for the two similar alternatives are distributed equally, the third alternative may be elected even though a majority of the voters would prefer either of the other two alternatives.
Approval Voting, introduced by Brams and Fishburn (1978) , has been ex-plicitly designed to overcome this drawback of Plurality Voting by allowing individuals to vote for (or approve of) as many alternatives as they wish to.
As usual, the alternative with most votes wins the election. Recent evidence from field experiments by Laslier and van der Straten (2008) 
in France and
Alós-Ferrer and Granić (2011) in Germany has shown that Approval Voting modifies the overall ranking of the alternatives and that it tends to elect the alternative that is most widely accepted in the population. This is the main reason why we deviate from using Plurality Voting as a benchmark and frame our analysis in the (more general and more complex) context when individuals can approve any number of alternatives.
Characterizations We are interested in general voting procedures that are operable in different voting environments in which the set of voters and the set of alternatives might vary. In particular, given a population of potential voters and a conceivable set of alternatives, a voting procedure should specify an outcome (a non-empty subset of the set of feasible alternatives) for every electorate (the individuals that indeed vote) and every set of feasible alternatives (the alternatives actually standing for election). We also assume that voters are partitioned into types according to some exogenous characteristics in such a way that individuals with equally relevant characteristics belong to the same type. In the examples of indirect democracy mentioned earlier, one can think of classifying voters into types in function of the number of people or the stake the voter represents. In problems of decision making in small groups, the voter's type could be associated with some of her personal characteristics such as seniority, age, etc.
In this setting, we consider a set of intuitive properties. First, we introduce two consistency properties that impose some structure on how the result of the voting procedure should be adapted when the set of alternatives or the set of individuals change: Consistency in alternatives, which is the analogue of Arrow's Choice Axiom, states that if the set of feasible alternatives is reduced yet some of the originally elected alternatives remain feasible, then exactly those alternatives have to be elected in the new situation; and Consistency in voters, which requires that if two disjoint electorates select a common set out of two feasible alternatives, then exactly this set has to be elected when the two electorates are assembled. Afterwards, we consider two symmetry properties: Symmetry across types, which means that voters of the same type have to be treated equally; and Symmetry across alternatives, which is the classical neutrality property. Finally, we add two well-known conditions: Faithfulness, which asks that if there is a single voter who approves but not , then has to be elected whenever and are the only two feasible alternatives; and Continuity which, roughly speaking, states that no group of individuals should be able to always impose completely its opinion on the result of an election when joint with a sufficiently large electorate formed by many subgroups that agree among them on the set of alternatives that has to be selected.
Our first result, Theorem 1, shows that these properties fully characterize a general class of voting procedures that we will call Type-weighted Approval Voting. Each voting procedure of this family is associated with a vector of strictly positive and finite weights, one for each type of voter, and the winning alternative is the one with the highest number of weighted votes. If no discrimination across types have sense in a particular context, all weights should be equal and the voting procedure reduces to Approval Voting. Exploiting this fact, we show in our second result, Theorem 2, that if Symmetry across types is strengthened to the classical condition of Anonymity (Symmetry across voters), one essentially obtains a new characterization of Approval Voting in which Faithfulness and Continuity are eliminated as necessary requirements.
Related Literature Our work contributes to the existing literature on axiomatic voting theory. Roberts (1991) was the first to characterize Plurality Voting. Richelson (1978) , Ching (1996) , and Yeh (2008) also characterize the Plurality Rule, but as a social choice correspondence and not as a voting procedure; that is, in these studies, the domain is the Cartesian product of all linear orders on the set of alternatives. Fishburn (1978 Fishburn ( , 1979 , Sertel (1988 One can think of Massó and Vorsatz (2008) and the characterization obtained in Theorem 1 as dual approaches that bear important similarities.
Massó and Vorsatz (2008) relax neutrality and, as a result, characterize voting rules that assign different weights to alternatives. In this paper, we weaken the classical anonymity property and, as a consequence, weights are assigned to voters. However, there is still one important asymmetry that naturally occurs in the formal analysis. In Massó and Vorsatz (2008) , the relative weight between two alternatives can be easily determined because it is known from the voting rule how many votes one alternative has to receive in order to compensate one vote to the other alternative. Yet, the construction of a weighted representation of a voting rule when anonymity is relaxed is more complicated. This is because adding one voter to an election has the effect that the particular weight of this voter has to be determined endogenously as well, and therefore, does not provide sufficient information of how to determine the relative weights of the other voters. Only the additional requirement that voters are divided into types and that there is an infinite population of potential voters of each type allows us to determine the relative weights.
Our second characterization, Theorem 2, also relates to the literature mentioned before. By working with a variable set of alternatives, contrary to the majority of studies found in the literature, we can naturally impose the property of Consistency in alternatives (which ultimately allows the decision maker to go forth and back between social choice and social welfare functions) in substitution of other properties. The only two other studies along the same line that characterize Approval Voting are Vorsatz (2007) and Sato (2013) . The former characterizes Approval Voting in a dichotomous preference setting using strategy-proofness. The latter characterizes Approval Voting independently and simultaneously to this paper by using a very similar set of axioms to that imposed in Theorem 2 (see the detailed discussion in Section 3).
Notation and Definitions
We consider a setting with variable sets of voters and alternatives. Formally, let be a finite set of conceivable alternatives. Generic alternatives will be denoted by , , and ; subsets of by and . As we have already outlined in the Introduction, the main objective of our study is to relax the anonymity assumption underlying Approval Voting.
One natural way to achieve this goal is to treat individuals with the same type equally but to possibly discriminate between votes coming from individuals of distinct types. The family we introduce next conceptualizes this idea by assigning an exogenous (possibly different) weight to each type. 
If p is such that = for all , ∈ Θ, then all voters are treated equally and the voting procedure coincides with Approval Voting.
Axioms and Characterizations
In this section, we are going to present a characterization of all Typeweighted Approval Voting procedures and a new characterization of Approval Voting. We start by introducing several properties.
Since we allow in our analysis for variable sets of feasible alternatives and voters, we necessarily need two consistency conditions that establish how the selected set of alternatives adapts as either of these changes. The first property states that if the set of feasible alternatives is reduced and some of the alternatives that originally were selected remain feasible, then exactly those have to be selected in the new situation.
Consistency in alternatives:
The voting procedure is consistent in alternatives if for all feasible sets of alternatives ⊂ ⊆ , all profiles ∈ (2 ) , and all electorates ⊂ such that (
The property of Consistency in alternatives is important because it allows us to reformulate the question of which alternatives to choose from each subset of alternatives to the question of how to order all alternatives of the universal set . To say it differently, the problems of constructing a social choice function and a social welfare function become equivalent (see , Arrow 1959 ). This is the reason why we can restrict our attention in the remaining axioms to sets of feasible alternatives that only contain two alternatives.
The second consistency property, Consistency in voters, says that if two disjoint groups of voters elect some common alternatives from the set { , }, 
Consistency in voters:
The voting procedure is consistent in voters if for all alternatives , ∈ , all profiles ∈ (2 ) , and all disjoint elec-
To shorten our notation, we will say that a voting procedure is consistent if it is both consistent in alternatives and consistent in voters.
Next, we will introduce three symmetry conditions. The first one, Symmetry across alternatives, is the standard Neutrality condition. It states that if alternatives are permuted, then the set of elected alternatives has to be permuted accordingly. To introduce it formally, we need additional notation:
given a permutation : → and a pair of alternatives { , }, let ( ) and ( { , } ( )) be the response profile and the set of elected alternatives permuted according to .
Symmetry across alternatives:
The voting procedure is symmetric across alternatives (or neutral) if for all alternatives , ∈ , all profiles ∈ (2 ) , all electorates ⊂ , and all permutations : → ,
The second symmetry condition, Symmetry across types, relaxes the classical anonymity axiom according to which the result of the election should be invariant to permutations of voters. Here, we only require this symmetry condition to hold true if voters of the same type are permuted. To introduce it formally, we say that two response profiles and ′ are isomorphic relative to { , } if for all ∈ Θ, there is a permutation :
Symmetry across types: The voting procedure is symmetric across types (or type-wise anonymous) if for all alternatives , ∈ and all response profiles and ′ that are isomorphic relative to { , },
Finally, the last symmetry condition, Symmetry across voters, is the classical Anonymity axiom. To introduce it formally, we will say that two response profiles and ′ are strongly isomorphic relative to { , } if there is a permutation : → such that
Symmetry across voters:
The voting procedure is symmetric across voters (or anonymous) if for all alternatives , ∈ and all response profiles and ′ that are strongly isomorphic relative to { , },
To shorten our notation, we will say that a voting procedure is weakly symmetric if it is both symmetric across alternatives and symmetric across types. We will say that it is symmetric if it is also symmetric across voters.
To introduce the next property, Continuity, consider an infinite number of disjoint electorates such that all of them only select the same alternative from the set { , }. Suppose also that there is another electorate , disjoint from the other electorates, for which is the unique alternative elected from the set { , }. The idea of continuity is that if a sufficient number of electorates that elect are joined together with , then alternative should be elected (but not necessarily excluding ). This condition eliminates, for example, dictatorship-like procedures that give an infinite weight to some type of voters or procedures that break ties in a lexicographic way.
Continuity: The voting procedure is continuous if for all alternatives
, ∈ , all profiles ∈ (2 ) , all successions of disjoint electorates { } such that { , } ( ) = { } for all ∈ ℕ, and any other electorate for
In the literature, similar conditions to Continuity are found under the names of Archimedean Property or Overwhelming Majority; see, Smith (1973) , Young (1975) , Richelson (1978) , Myerson (1996) , or Alcalde-Unzu and Vorsatz (2009).
2
Finally, we introduce a weak unanimity condition which establishes that getting more votes is desirable. The following property is a weak condition inspired by Fishburn (1978) .
Faithfulness:
The voting procedure is faithful if for all individuals ∈ and all alternatives , ∈ ,
2 The main differences between this version and others are: ( ) In other stronger versions, it is imposed that { , } ( 1∪ 2 ∪...∪ ∪ ) = { } and/or that the requirement has to be satisfied also for any ′ > ; and ( ) other versions require that the electorates of the sequence have to be isomorphic instead of requiring that they select the same set of alternatives.
proval Voting procedures.
Theorem 1
The voting procedure is consistent, weakly symmetric, continuous, and faithful if and only if it is a Type-weighted Approval Voting.
The proof that the mentioned properties imply to be a Type-weighted Approval Voting is constructive and divided into several steps (see the Appendix). We now shortly explain the structure of the proof in order to facilitate its reading. We also show in the Appendix that the properties used in Theorem 1 are independent, separating both consistency and weak symmetry in their respective parts.
Proposition 1
The properties in Theorem 1 are independent.
At this point it is important to study the consequences of strengthening Symmetry across types to the classical Anonymity property (that is, to strengthen weak symmetry to symmetry). 3 Since Approval Voting is the unique Type-weighted Approval Voting procedure that is also symmetric, we obviously obtain a characterization of Approval Voting. However, one important insight is that one can then, at the same time, eliminate the continuity axiom, a fact that has been shown independently and simultaneously to this paper by Sato (2013) using a different proof technique. 4 But one can even go one step further as it is shown in our second theorem: if one strengthens weak symmetry to symmetry and eliminates faithfulness together with continuity, one still obtains essentially a characterization of Approval Voting. 5 Before introducing the result, we need to define a non-degenerate voting procedure as a voting procedure that does not always select all available alternatives. is not needed when faithfulness is added as a necessary axiom. 5 We omit the independence of the axioms given that it is very similar to the one of Theorem 1. The proof that the mentioned properties imply to be Approval Voting or Disapproval Voting is constructive and similar to that of Theorem 1 (see the Appendix). In particular, step 1 is the same in both proofs, step 2 is not necessary any further, and the remaining steps follow a similar path, but with strong results in this case given that the set of properties is stronger.
We now shortly explain this final part in order to facilitate the reading of the proof. The imposition of Consistency in alternatives also allows us to directly relate our characterization to existing results on social welfare functions. In many other cases the voters only represent themselves, yet it might still be desirable to implement a discriminative voting rule. This is the point where the discussion about which characteristics should determine the weight clearly emerges. Even though it is impossible to provide a definite guideline, one can look, for example, at elections in universities. In some of them, voters are classified depending on their type of affiliation (students, administrative staff, professors, etc.); in others, the classification is more detailed and also considers other aspects such as seniority.
All in all, and independently of the more or less difficulty to define the appropriate criteria to classify voters, our axiomatic study provides a theoretical background for the use of a Type-weighted Approval Voting procedure.
Proofs
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 have the following lemma in common.
Lemma 1 If the voting procedure is consistent in voters and neutral, then for all alternatives , ∈ , all profiles ∈ (2 ) , all electorates ⊂ and all voters ∈ such that ∩ { , } ∈ {∅, { , }},
Proof: Take any two alternatives , ∈ , any profile ∈ (2 ) , any electorate ⊂ and any voter ∈ such that ∩ { , } ∈ {∅, { , }}.
We are going to show first by contradiction that
Suppose that { , } ( ) = { }. Consider the permutation : → such that ( ) = , ( ) = and ( ) = for all ∈ ∖ { , }. Then, by
that ({ , }) = { , } by definition of and that ( ) = , we have that { , } ( ) = { }. This is a contradiction. Since { , } ( ) = { } can be excluded using a similar argument and since
implies that we can apply consistency in voters to obtain that
This concludes the proof of the lemma. □
The successive applications of Lemma 1 implies that given an electorate and any two alternatives and standing for election, it can be assumed that all individuals belonging to vote for one and only one of these two alternatives (voters who do not declare a strict preference between and can simply be discarded). Also note that if ∈ {∅, { , }} for all ∈ , then both alternatives have to be elected by neutrality.
Proof of Theorem 1
It is easy to check that all Type-weighted Approval Voting procedures satisfy consistency, weak symmetry, continuity and faithfulness. The proof that these properties imply to be a Type-weighted Approval Voting follows the steps mentioned in the main text.
We first have that Lemma 1 can be applied. Now, we establish other lemmas.
Lemma 2 If the voting procedure is consistent in voters and weakly symmetric, then for all alternatives , ∈ , all profiles ∈ (2 ) , and all
Proof: Take any two alternatives , ∈ , any profile ∈ (2 ) , and any electorate ⊂ such that ( ) = ( ) for all ∈ Θ. By Lemma 1, we can assume that ∩ { , } ∈ {{ }, { }} for all ∈ . Partition the electorate into sub-electorates 1 , . . . , in such a way that ∈ if and only if ∈ ∩ .
Consider any type ∈ Θ for which | | > 0. We are going to show by con-
the permutation : → such that ( ) = , ( ) = , and ( ) = for all ∈ ∖ { , }. Then, by neutrality, Lemma 3 If the voting procedure is consistent in voters and weakly symmetric, then for all alternatives , , , ∈ , all profiles , ′ ∈ (2 ) , and all electorates , ⊂ such that
Proof: Take any four alternatives , , , ∈ , any two profiles , ′ ∈ (2 ) , and any two electorates , ⊂ such that ( ) = ( ′ ) and ( ) = ( ′ ) for all ∈ Θ. By Lemma 1, we can assume that ∩ { , } ∈ {{ }, { }} for all ∈ and ′ ∩ { , } ∈ {{ }, { }} for all ∈ . Partition the electorate into sub-electorates 1 , . . . , in such a way that ∈ if and only if ∈ ∩ . Construct the electorates 1 , . . . , in an identical manner.
For each type ∈ Θ, partition the electorate into two sub-electorates, Consider the permutation : → such that ( ) = and ( ) = .
Then, ( ′ ) and are isomorphic relative to { , } for all ∈ Θ and all ∈ {1, 2}. Summing up over all types we can see that the response profiles
and (
) are isomorphic relative to { , }. By type-wise anonymity,
Also, we have that , (
) = 0 for all ∈ Θ by the way we partitioned the electorates. So, define 2 =
) and apply Lemma 2 to see that
Now, apply consistency in voters together with Equations (1) and (2) to see
). This, together with Equation (1), implies that
Finally, consider the permutation −1 . By neutrality,
. This, together with Equation (3),
Consider the following binary relation ≿ defined over ℕ × ℕ : for all
. . , ) if there exists a response profile and two alternatives , ∈ such that ∈ { , } ( ) and for all ∈ Θ, ( ) = and ( ) = . Our objective is to show that the triple (ℕ , ≿, +) is a closed extensive structure; that is, this triple satisfies the following properties (see Krantz et al. 1971 ):
( 1 , . . . , )).
Lemma 4
If the voting procedure is consistent in voters, weakly symmetric and continuous, the triple (ℕ , ≿, +) is a closed extensive structure.
Proof: We show that the triple (ℕ , ≿, +) satisfies the conditions of Complete Preorder, Associativity, Independence, and Archimedean.
Complete Preorder: To see that the binary relation ≿ is well-defined, take any ( 1 , . . . , ), ( 1 , . . . , ) ∈ ℕ and consider the response profiles , ′ together with the alternatives , , , ∈ such that ( ) = ( ′ ) = and ( ) = ( ′ ) = for all ∈ Θ. We have to To show that the binary relation ≿ is complete, note first that for any ( 1 , . . . , ), ( 1 , . . . , ) ∈ ℕ , we can consider a response profile and two alternatives , ∈ such that for all ∈ Θ, ∩ consists of individuals voting only for alternative and individuals voting only for alternative . This is always possible because is an infinite set for all ∈ Θ. By definition of , we have that
Then, it follows from the definition of
and/or ( 1 , . . . , ) ≿ ( 1 , . . . , ). Hence, ≿ is complete.
To see that ≿ is transitive, take any 
If it was the case that ∈ { , , } ( ), then, by consistency in alternatives, we would have ∈ { , } ( ). This con-
If it was the case that ∈ { , , } ( ), then, by consistency in alternatives, we would have ∈ { , } ( ). This, together with the assumption ∈ { , } ( ), would imply that { , } ( ) = { , }. Hence, by consistency in alternatives, ∈ { , , } ( ), which contradicts case (a). 
Additionally, any other function satisfies conditions ( ) and ( ) if and only if there exists ∈ ℝ ++ such that = ⋅ .
Using this result we construct the vector of weights p = ( 1 , . . . , ) by setting (1, 0, . . . , 0) equal to 1 , (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) equal to 2 , and so forth.
Since we know from condition (ii) that ( 1 , . . . , ) = ( 1 , 0, . . . , 0) + (0, 2 , 0, . . . , 0) + . . . + (0, 0, . . . , ), we have that
Then, it follows from condition (i) and the definition of ≿ that for all response profiles and all alternatives , ∈ ,
We also know from Faithfulness that > 0 for all ∈ Θ and, therefore, we have shown that the subfamily { } | |=2 is a Type-weighted Approval Voting with respect to the vector of weights p = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ). Consequently, it remains to be shown that the vector of weights p = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) is such that for all sets of feasible alternatives ⊆ , independently of its size, and all response profiles ,
Suppose first that ∈ ( ). Then, by consistency in alternatives,
Since we already know that, for all pairs of alternatives, { , } is the Type-weighted Approval Voting with respect to
, it has to be the case that
. Then, given that, for all pairs of alternatives, { , } ( ) is the Type- 
Proof of Proposition 1
To establish the independence of the axioms, we are going to present six voting procedures that violate one different axiom each and satisfy the remaining five properties. 
Consistency in alternatives:
{ }, then ( { , } ) = { } and { , } ( { , } ) = { , }. Since ( { , } )∩{ , } ∕ = ∅, consistency in alternatives implies that { , } ( { , } ) = ( { , } ) ∩ { , } = { }. This contradicts that { , } ( { , } ) = { , }.
Consistency in voters:
Let the voting procedure be equal to Approval
Voting whenever all individuals belonging to the electorate are of the same type; otherwise select all feasible alternatives. This procedure is consistent in alternatives, type-wise anonymous, neutral, faithful, and continuous. The following example shows that it is not consistent in voters. Consider = { , } and suppose that 1 ∈ and 2 ∈ . If
Type-wise anonymity: Assign to each individual ∈ a weight greater than a strictly positive number . Also assume that > for some pair , ∈ for some ∈ Θ. Let the voting procedure be such that for all sets of feasible alternatives ⊆ , all profiles ∈ (2 ) , and all electorates
∈ . This procedure is consistent in alternatives, consistent in voters, neutral, faithful, and continuous. The following example shows that it is not type-wise anonymous.
Consider
= { , } and , ∈ for some ∈ Θ such that > .
If
= { } and = { }, then { , } ( { , } ) = { }. Now, take any permutation : → such that ( ) = and ( ) = . Then,
Since type-wise anonymity implies that
this is a contradiction.
Neutrality: Assign to each alternative ∈ a strictly positive weight .
Assume also that > for some , ∈ . Let the voting procedure be such that for all sets of feasible alternatives ⊆ , all profiles ∈ for all ∈ ℕ. Consequently, continuity implies that there is some ∈ ℕ such
..∪ ∪{ } ) = { } for all ∈ ℕ. This is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2
It is easy to check that Approval and Disapproval Voting satisfy consistency and symmetry. The proof that these properties imply to be one of these voting procedures follows the steps mentioned in the main text.
Observe that Lemma 1 still applies. The following lemma introduces a stronger result than that of Lemma 3, given the strengthening of weak symmetry to symmetry.
Lemma 5
If the voting procedure is consistent in voters and symmetric, then for all alternatives , , , ∈ , all profiles , ′ ∈ (2 ) , and all electorates , ⊂ such that
Proof: Take any four alternatives , , , ∈ , any two profiles , ′ ∈ (2 ) , and any two electorates , ⊂ such that ( ) = ( ′ ) and ( ) = ( ′ ). By Lemma 1, we can assume that ∩ { , } ∈ {{ }, { }} for all ∈ and ′ ∩ { , } ∈ {{ }, { }} for all ∈ . Consider the permutation : → such that ( ) = and ( ) = . Then, it is easy to see that ( ′ ) and are strongly isomorphic relative to { , }.
Then, by anonymity,
. This, together with Equation (4), implies that −1 ( { , } ( )) = { , } ( ′ ). Hence, ∈ { , } ( ) if and only if ∈ { , } ( ′ ) and ∈ { , } ( ) if and only if ∈ { , } ( ′ ). □ Now, we introduce a binary relation ≿ defined over ℕ×ℕ: for all , ∈ ℕ, ≿ if there exists a response profile and two alternatives , ∈ such that ∈ { , } ( ), ( ) = and ( ) = .
Lemma 6 The binary relation ≿ is ≥, ≤, or =.
Proof: First, it is easy to see that, by Lemma 5, ≿ is well-defined. The proof that it is complete and transitive follows the same steps as the corresponding proof of Theorem 1. Thus, it is omitted.
Since the binary relation ≿ is well-defined, complete, and transitive, it is a complete preorder. Now, we will show that for all , ∈ ℕ, ≿ if and only if ( + 1) ≿ ( + 1). To prove this, consider a response profile such 
